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The United Nations was created in 1945 to prevent another world war. It was     designed, as the Preamble to the UN Charter states, to eliminate the scourge of
war that had befallen humanity twice in the first half of the twentieth century. The
United Nations, as the successor to the failed experiment of the League of Nations,
embodied Wilsonian idealism. It represented the liberal internationalist approach to
world politics, which offered an alternative model to realism,1  dealing with the
central problem of international relations — the avoidance of world war. From a
realist perspective, there were elements in the British government that saw the
League as a means of bringing the United States into the security structure of
Europe.2  France was also interested in using the League as an instrument to resolve
its security dilemma vis-à-vis a revenge-seeking Germany in the future.
Unfortunately and tragically for Woodrow Wilson, the United States never joined
the League of Nations due to the resurgence of isolationist sentiment after the Great
War.3
The United Nations was based on the neo-liberal assumption that international
institutions could make a difference in preventing and resolving wars in the interna-
tional system.4  The centerpiece of the war-prevention and conflict-resolution system
of the United Nations was the philosophy of collective security, which was supposed
to offer an alternative method of maintaining international order, in comparison to
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the amoral, Machiavellian, balance of power politics that had led to the collapse of
the international system twice in the twentieth century, and had brought untold suf-
fering to humanity.5  More importantly, the United Nations was supposed to repre-
sent the best impulses of world civilization, in the sense that it would prevent
another Holocaust and genocidal slaughter of the innocents, plunging humanity into
the dark ages once again.
Collective Security
To accomplish this objective, the central principle upon which the United Nations
was based, as had been the League of Nations before it, was that of collective secu-
rity, to represent the will of the international community to deter and punish acts of
aggression committed in interstate conflict. “Evil doers” who committed acts of
aggression would be faced with the overwhelming might and righteous wrath of the
international community.6  It is very important to point out, in connection with this,
that the United Nations was not originally designed to deal with internal or intrastate
wars, which have emerged as the major form of conflict since the end of the Cold
War, but rather was designed to deal with interstate conflicts.7  Indeed, article 2(7) of
the UN Charter prohibits the United Nations from intervening in matters that fall
within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, unless there is a chapter VII enforcement
action underway there.8  But this article may need to be rewritten and adapted to a
new concept of sovereignty that has emerged in connection with the recent trend
toward humanitarian intervention (two recent cases being Kosovo and East Timor in
1999), which has been driven by the neo-liberal philosophy that the international
community has a responsibility to protect human rights, a responsibility that takes
precedence over the traditional Westphalian notion of state sovereignty, which is
based on the idea that a government can do whatever it wants to on its own terri-
tory.9  As Michael Walzer writes, “Humanitarian intervention is a response to acts
that shock the moral conscience of mankind.”10  On the other hand, an obstacle to
humanitarian intervention stems from the developing nations that object to interna-
tional intervention in matters that are perceived as falling within the domestic juris-
diction of a state.11
The idea of collective security is based on a number of assumptions, the basic
features of which could be attributable to Wilsonian idealism and its precursors.
Collective security is supposed to represent the organized will and power of the
international community, which in a Manichean sense, from a moral point of view,
would personify the forces of good, which would oppose any real or potential ag-
gression, which was depicted as synonymous with the forces of evil. The use of
force by the international community in this fashion was collectively legitimized,
even though a hegemonic power like the United States could turn a collectively
legitimized action to its own national interest, as in the case of the UN “police
action” in Korea in 195012  or the “coalition of the willing” led by the United States
in the Gulf war in 1990–91. The organized power of that nebulous entity known as
the “international community,” according to the philosophy of collective security,
would be superior to that, it was assumed, of any real or potential aggressor(s).
Furthermore, it was assumed that the international community would have no
difficulty in marshalling an overwhelming amount of force to deter or compel an
aggressor to comply with the norms of international law. Even collective security, as
idealistic as it was, was in the final analysis rooted in the process of making calcula-
tions about the application of the mechanics of power in international politics.
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Supposedly, the power of the international community would be sufficient to deter a
potential
aggressor from making a miscalculation13  in engaging in risk-taking behavior that
could unleash the dogs of war. It was erroneously assumed that through rational
calculation, a potential aggressor would add up the costs and benefits of starting a
war and would be deterred by the prospect of having to face the overwhelming force
of the mobilized international community. But as numerous studies by political sci-
entists have shown, wars often start because the aggressors either underestimate or
overestimate the intentions and capabilities of their opponents.14  In addition, it is
more often the case that a divided and weak international community, rather than
deterring aggression, often encourages it because it lacks the resolve and will to deal
decisively with aggression, as the reaction of the international community to the
wars of the Yugoslavian succession from 1991 onward have amply demonstrated. In
1991, the United States did not believe at first that its vital interests were involved in
Yugoslavia, and as a distant, offshore balancer, left it up to the Europeans to deal
with the disintegration of that state.15  On the other hand, the United States was
ready to lead a UN-sanctioned “coalition of the willing” against Iraq in 1991,
because its policy makers responsible for defining national interest believed that the
country’s vital interests were at stake.
According to the theory of neo-liberal institutionalism, it was also assumed that
collective security must operate within the framework of international institutions,
such as the League of Nations or the United Nations, in order for it to be imple-
mented effectively. International institutions were to constrain the behavior of
potential international law–breakers through the application of a series of sanctions
(found in article 16 of the League of Nations and article 41, chapter VII, of the UN
Charter) ranging from diplomatic actions to economic steps, to the ultimate sanction
of the use of force by the international community.16  Ideally, from the neo-liberal
institutionalist perspective, states, by participating in international institutions,
would learn to cooperate with one another and resolve their disputes through peace-
ful means and thereby prevent the outbreak of wars in the first place. Neo-liberal
institutionalists believe that there is a direct connection between the domestic source
of the foreign policy behavior of a state and the prevention of the outbreak of war.17
There was faith in the age-old idea of Immanuel Kant expressed in 1795, that if
“constitutional republics” would become the prevalent form of government, then
international institutions consisting of such states would guarantee “Perpetual
Peace,” contrary to Helmuth von Moltke’s notion that “Perpetual Peace is a dream
 . . . and war is an integral part of God’s ordering of the universe.”18  As the world
experienced various waves of democratization, since the eighteenth century, this
notion was also echoed in Wilson’s idea of justifying American participation in the
First World War, that is, to make the world “safe for democracy,” and in the post–
Cold War Grand Strategy of the United States, of expanding the zone of democracy,
and therefore the zone of peace.19  This is based on the assumption that liberal de-
mocracies are less war-prone and have less of a tendency to go to war against each
other, although generally speaking, liberal democracies are no less war-prone than
non-democracies. The democratic peace theorist argues that it is the internal makeup
of a state that matters, and therefore challenges the realist paradigm of world poli-
tics.20  According to the democratic peace theorist, liberal democracies have less of a
tendency to go to war against other liberal democracies because they are constrained
from doing so by institutional or structural factors, such as check and balance sys-
tems and a political division of power in the government. There is also a sharing of
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cultural factors such as the commonality of democratic values, which inhibit liberal
democracies from waging war against each other.21  Exceptions to the rule that
democracies don’t wage war against other democracies, such as Athens versus
Sparta, the War of 1812, the U.S. Civil War, and the Spanish-American War of
1898, is explained by the fact that one of the states in each of these cases was not a
genuine liberal democracy. Critics of democratic peace theory argue that it does not
explain a number of “near misses,” such as the United States–British dispute over the
borders between Venezuela and British Guyana in 1895. In that instance, it is argued,
the United States and Britain drew back from war not because they were liberal
democracies, but because of realist power calculations.22  Given the popularity of
democratic peace theory after the end of the Cold War, though, it has been the West-
ern liberal model of democracy that has served as the paradigm for the UN’s post-
conflict peace-building strategy that has formed such an essential component of its
comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping.
Since the ultimate sanction of collective security is force, international institu-
tions needed to set up some kind of an arrangement in which military force could be
brought to bear against a recalcitrant lawbreaker, as a last resort, if necessary.
    But the League of Nations never set up a permanent international police or mili-
tary force, even though it did engage in a few ad hoc peacekeeping operations in
such places as Vilna, in Lithuania, in the Saar, and in Upper Silesia, and Leticia in
Latin America. The idea of collective security by the League’s successor was based
on the notion that an international institution such as the United Nations would have
a robust military force at its disposal to enforce the decisions of the international
community, although it was understood from the very beginning that this force
would never be used against the permanent members of the Security Council, be-
cause such an action could result in the outbreak of a major war. Nonetheless, the
framers of the UN Charter were well aware of the fact that a glaring defect that was
associated with the League’s system of collective security was the failure of the
international community to establish a permanent international military force.23
Furthermore, the League system, based to a considerable extent on following such
diplomatic methods as arbitration as outlined in articles 11 and 12 in the Covenant,
was too slow and cumbersome in preventing and resolving conflicts. Moreover, the
Covenant of the League almost seemed to legitimize war, mentioning it as a recourse
open to parties to a dispute if diplomatic efforts at resolution within the framework
of the League failed.24  In the case of the League of Nations, by the 1930s, balance
of power politics had once again replaced the idea of collective security as the orga-
nizing principle of interwar international relations, as the international system (a
series of crises such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian inva-
sion of Ethiopia in the mid 1930s, the Spanish civil war in the same time period, the
German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the Sudetenland crisis in 1938,
the union between Austria and Germany in the same year in violation of the
Versailles Peace Treaty, and the German invasion of rump Czechoslovakia in 1939,
which attested to all of this) came crashing down in 1939 with the outbreak of the
Second World War.25
Consequently, the United Nations was created in San Francisco in 1945 by the
international community, identified as the victorious wartime allies (the term United
Nations itself was coined in 1942 to refer to the allied wartime coalition formed to
defeat the Axis powers), with the purpose of having yet another try at devising a
world organization that would maintain stability through collective security in the
international system.26  President Roosevelt hoped that the wartime Grand Alliance
79
between the Soviet Union and the United States would continue to function in the
postwar world. The “Big Two,” would operate as the policemen of the world,
according to the Rooseveltian scheme of postwar international order. The type of
international military force provided to the UN to accomplish this task was based
upon the model that had successfully led the Allied wartime coalition to victory in
World War II. A permanent military force was supposed to be created as the en-
forcement arm of the Security Council, drawn from its five permanent members,
that would supply national contingents on the basis of agreements that would be
negotiated according to article 43 of the UN Charter. The Military Staff Committee,
a subordinate unit of the Security Council that consisted of the military representa-
tives of the five permanent members of the Council, was entrusted with the respon-
sibility for drawing up the blueprint for the permanent army. But by 1947, it was
clear that the outbreak of the Cold War had made this impossible. Therefore, not
only did the United Nations lack the permanent international military force that the
founders had envisaged in the agreements, but the agreements themselves were never
negotiated.27
Unfortunately, the whole principle of collective security itself was actually em-
bedded in a realist conception of international order, which rested on the idea that
the fundamental principle of international relations was that of state sovereignty,
with the state functioning as the primary unit of the international system.28  This was
reflected in the structure and distribution of power in the Security Council of the
United Nations, with each one of its five permanent members being allocated a spe-
cial voting right known as the veto, which allowed it to protect its national interest.
This virtually guaranteed that the United Nations would not function as an effective
instrument of collective security.
The failure to agree on the structure and the composition of a robust permanent
international military force meant that over the next half a century the United
Nations had to improvise in dealing with wars.29  This is because the very term
peacekeeping is not even mentioned anywhere in the Charter and during the next
five and a half decades the United Nations engaged in over fifty peacekeeping
(chapter VI) and enforcement (chapter VII) operations, which encompassed a wide
variety of different forms.
Peacekeeping and Enforcement
Operations
Peacekeeping or chapter VI-operations usually deal with a conflict situation in which
the consent of the host state or states where the force is to be deployed has been
secured.30  More often than not, these consent-type forces were mandated under
chapter VI, which dealt with peacemaking, within the framework of third-party
mediation of a conflict, rather than chapter VII, which dealt with enforcement
action, which does not require the consent of the parties to a conflict. There has
been a significant upsurge of enforcement operations since the end of the Cold
War.31  Chapter VII mandates an enforcement operation to go into an area without
the consent of the government or parties to the conflict, before a cease-fire or an
armistice has been achieved. The enforcement-type operation therefore is far riskier
than the traditional consent-type of operation that was the prevalent model of peace-
keeping during the Cold War. The consent-type operation usually went into an area
after a cease-fire or armistice agreement had already been negotiated, to function as
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a kind of buffer force to keep the belligerents apart.32  In contrast, in the post–Cold
War age of increased “ethno-political conflict,” placing lightly armed blue helmets
into the middle of a vicious civil war and with rules of engagement that only allow
them to use their weapons for self-defense (as in the case of the former Yugoslavia)
has resulted in situations in which peacekeepers have been attacked with impunity,
killed, or taken hostage and stripped of their weapons.33  States, especially industrial-
ized democratic states, have become increasingly reluctant to expose their troops to
this kind of treatment, as “donor fatigue” has set in.34
 The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping
UN peacekeeping has undergone a process of evolution from more simple buffer-
type forces imposed between belligerents to uphold a cease-fire to more complex
multidimensional types of operations that may include the peace-building of failed
states. Although it should be stressed that a traditional Cold War peacekeeping force
like ONUC, the United Nations Operations in the Congo, (1960–64) in many ways
served as a precursor for current operations that find themselves embroiled in a civil
conflict in the post–Cold War world.35
The evolution of UN peacekeeping can be divided into four generations: the first
generation consisted of the classical or traditional Cold War peacekeeping operation;
the second, of transitional operations that were devised as the Cold War was winding
down; and the third phase of peacekeeping consisted of complex multidimensional
post–Cold War operations that mostly involved humanitarian intervention in civil
conflicts, such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda.36  The latest and
fourth generation consists of UN-sanctioned multinational forces designed to engage
in robust military action under the command of one or more “lead” states, to be
followed by a UN peacekeeping stabilization force when it is possible to secure
collective legitimation from the Security Council to do so. Further, the evolution of
generations of UN peacekeeping does not necessarily proceed in a unilinear fashion,
but more traditional forms of peacekeeping can coexist with newer forms.
The first classic peacekeeping operation was UNEF I (United Nations Emergency
Force) that was deployed in the Sinai peninsula (from 1956 to 1967), following the
Suez Canal war of 1956.37  The next major Cold War UN peacekeeping operation
was ONUC. This first Congo operation, strictly speaking, was not a buffer force,
but instead intervened militarily in a Congolese civil war. This was done at the ini-
tiative of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to end the secession of Katanga, the
southernmost province of the Congo, a rebellion that had been orchestrated by Bel-
gian economic interests.38  Both the UNEF I and Congo operations also should be
seen within the context of the Cold War, as instruments designed to serve Western
interests by preventing the Soviets from establishing their influence in the Middle
East and Africa. During the Cold War the UN also developed some experience in
dealing with the problems associated with resolving ethnic civil conflict when
UNFICYP (the United Nations Force in Cyprus) was dispatched to Cyprus in 1964
to function as a buffer between the warring Turkish and Greek Cypriote communi-
ties.39  Some analysts believe that UNFICYP, which in 2003 was still in existence, is
a good example of a successful UN peacekeeping operation.40  It is argued that a
quasi-permanent force like UNFICYP can serve as a stabilizing element in pro-
tracted conflicts. Other examples of “quasi-permanent” forces created during the
Cold War and still in existence, performing this stabilizing function, are UNDOF
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(the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) that was deployed along the
Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights in 1974, and UNIFIL (the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon), which was positioned in southern Lebanon in 1978, as
well as a small UN observer force in Kashmir.
On the other hand, it can be argued that quasi-permanent peacekeeping forces that
become fixtures in protracted regional conflicts may only serve to freeze the conflict
by providing the parties to the dispute with an excuse not to find a political solution
to it.
In any event, throughout most of the 1980s, there was a freeze in the creation of
new peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, in part because the Reagan
administration was not enthusiastic about supporting them.
The next stage in the evolution of UN peacekeeping occurred in the latter part of
the 1980s with the emergence of what has been dubbed transitional operations, that
is, operations that took place in the transition between the end of the Cold War and
the post–Cold War period, a much more optimistic view of the role of the United
Nations as an instrument of peacekeeping in the international system. The situation
changed markedly as a result of the “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy under
the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev.41  The “new thinking” included a greater will-
ingness on the part of Moscow to turn toward the United Nations as an instrument
that could be used to resolve regional conflicts, especially those of a Cold War na-
ture.42  These peacekeeping forces became more complex and multidimensional. As a
result the UN was able to dispatch peacekeepers and observers to terminate wars,
oversee elections and promote peace-building, and attempt to promote national rec-
onciliation in regional-type conflicts in Afghanistan, Namibia, Iran and Iraq,
Angola, Central America, and (Cambodia) Kampuchea with varying degrees of
success. 43  But, if there were no peace to keep, peacekeeping did not eliminate the
conflicts concerned when wars restarted in the same places. For example, in the
cases of Afghanistan and Angola, civil conflict and turmoil were endemic, following
the termination of UN peacekeeping operations. Nor did post-conflict peace-build-
ing always result in the emergence of a “liberal democracy.” The post-conflict re-
gime established in Cambodia after the termination of one of the UN’s most costly
missions can hardly be viewed as democratic. Moreover, the United Nations has, for
example, found it very difficult to terminate the civil conflict and promote national
reconciliation in Angola, having attempted to do so with a succession of peacekeep-
ing and observer operations.44  An end to that conflict was only made possible by the
death in 2002 of Joseph Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, the revolutionary movement
there. In connection with Angola and elsewhere, the security of observers and peace-
keepers has been one of the major problems that the UN has faced in the post–
Cold War world, when local warlords, who often function as “spoilers” of cease-fire
accords and armistices in internal conflicts, treat the UN with a culture of impunity.
The need to secure the safety of UN personnel was underscored by the bombing of
UN headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, resulting in the death of the
Secretary-General’s Special Representative.
The third stage in the evolution of UN peacekeeping, following the traditional
and transitional stages (although models were developed during these stages that can
be used as guidelines for the post–Cold War era) mostly consisted of humanitarian
intervention in civil wars, as the end of the Cold War witnessed an outbreak of
regional conflicts that had been suppressed by superpower competition. More
emphasis in this third generation of peacekeeping was placed on a comprehensive
approach, which involved not only peace-keeping but also peace-building.45  Peace-
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building encompasses such activities as the reconstruction of civil society in a failed
or failing state, the demobilization and disarmament of belligerents, the supervision
of elections and the promotion of the rule of law (in the case of East Timor, this
also involves supervising elections for a constituent assembly to draft a constitution,
resulting in the emergence of Timor Leste as an independent state), the reconstruc-
tion of a society’s shattered wartime infrastructure, assuring the delivery of humani-
tarian aid, ensuring the protection of the human rights of minorities, and creating
tribunals to punish war criminals(transitional justice), safeguarding and facilitating
the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and promoting national rec-
onciliation through the creation of national commissions on Reconciliation and
Truth. This certainly represents an extremely ambitious array of tasks for an organi-
zation that may not have the resources or the will to carry them out. In post-conflict
situations, the task can be summed up as disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-
gration.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was an explosion of UN peacekeeping
activities that unrealistically raised expectations that the United Nations, having
broken free of the Cold War, would now be able to function in the manner that its
founding fathers had intended, as a significant actor in the international system,
since it would no longer be marginalized by American-Soviet Cold War competi-
tion.46  This false hope may have been fed by the success of the United States in
leading a UN-sanctioned “coalition of the willing” to deal with the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990–91 (somewhat similar to what had occurred in Korea in 1950-53),
and American triumphalism that a new world order was in the making.
The Clinton administration also initially advocated a policy of “assertive
multilateralism,” that is, strong support of international institutions like the UN, as a
central tenet of its foreign policy. The support of the U.S. “hyper-power” was con-
sidered critical to the success of the UN, even though the United States has tended to
function as a hegemonic power in its relationship with the world organization at
times, that is, use it for purposes to advance its own national interest, rather than the
interests of the international community. But the hopes that the United Nations
would be able to function as an effective actor on the world stage in the realm of
peacekeeping suffered major setbacks in the former Yugoslavia (1991–95) and in
Rwanda in 1994, especially as the world organization failed to prevent genocide and
ethnic cleansing from taking place. With very limited resources and military advi-
sors, the UN Secretariat was placed virtually in the impossible situation, often in the
early 1990s, of having to put UN peacekeeping forces together in an ad hoc and
improvised fashion. This usually had to be done within a very short period of time,
often driven by the desire on the part of the permanent members of the Security
Council to appear to be “doing something” in reaction to outraged international
public opinion to genocide and ethnic cleansing.
Rwanda and Srebrenica
In discussing the evolution of UN peacekeeping, two cases stand out among the
more than fifty since 1945, and therefore require special attention: the genocide that
occurred in Rwanda in 1994, and the massacre of about eight thousand Bosnian
Moslems in Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995.47  Both of these horrific events occurred
when the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was the Under-Secretary-General
for UN Peacekeeping. They both represented some of the most negative turning
points in the post–Cold War history of UN peacekeeping.
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One of the greatest peacekeeping failures of the United Nations in the twentieth
century was its inability to prevent genocide from taking place in Rwanda. The UN
is still wrestling with the legacy of the enormity of this evil, which put to the test
the very meaning of the existence of the organization as a factor of justice in world
civilization. As former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote, “the geno-
cide in Rwanda in 1994 was one of the greatest tragedies since the Second World
War.”48  As an Independent Commission of Inquiry that was set up by Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in 1999 to investigate the genocide in Rwanda stressed, “the
international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing
once the genocide had begun.”49  In a short period of one hundred days in 1994,
about 800,000 members of an ethnic community known as the Tutsi were slaugh-
tered (along with Hutu moderates) by Hutu extremists.50
In terms of the historical background to the civil conflict that took place in
Rwanda, it should be pointed out that the Tutsi, long favored by the colonial powers
(Germany and Belgium) that had ruled Rwanda, were subsequently overthrown by
the majority Hutus in 1959, as periodic bloodbaths marked the relations between the
two ethnic groups. The descendents of the Tutsi who had been forced into exile
launched an invasion of Rwanda in 1991, and in 1993 the UN became involved in
arranging a cease-fire there. It is necessary to point out that the conflict in Rwanda
was also caused by the poor state of the political economy of the country, since
Rwanda, primarily an agricultural country, was one of the most overcrowded coun-
tries on the Continent.51
The UN Security Council had authorized a UN peacekeeping force for Rwanda,
known as UNAMIR (the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda) in 1993, to
oversee a peace agreement (the Arusha Accords) that had been negotiated between
the two warring ethnic groups there. UNAMIR was entrusted with the mission to set
up a secure zone in the Rwandan capital city of Kigali.
The entire UN operation in Rwanda, however, suffered from a distinct lack of
political will (perhaps with the exception of the French who wanted to maintain a
Francophone sphere of influence in Africa) on the part of the permanent members of
the Security Council.52  This was especially true of the United States since the de-
bacle in Somalia, when eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in October
1993.53  Even though the soldiers were operating under U.S. and not UN command,
the United States retreated from its policy of “assertive multilateralism.”54  Public
opinion and Congress turned against U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping, except
under extraordinary conditions especially when the national interest of the country
was involved. This, combined with the reluctance of the Pentagon to place U.S.
troops under foreign command, resulted in a sharp reversal of the Clinton
administration’s policy. A new Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25) was issued
right in the middle of the Rwandan crisis, which sharply constrained the ability of
the United States to participate in future peacekeeping operations.55  Consequently,
we also see a shift in the U.S. position in which Washington evidences a preference
for high-risk military operations to be undertaken within the framework of regional
military alliances such as NATO, rather than by multilateral institutions such as the
UN, thereby for example, setting the stage for the U.S. option to engage NATO
rather than the UN in Kosovo in 1999.
This translated into a reluctance to provide UNAMIR with the financial resources
and equipment that it needed. General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian general who
was placed in command of UNAMIR, argued that a military force of about forty-
five hundred was necessary to properly carry out UNAMIR’s mission, while the
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United States proposed the deployment of a UN force of about one hundred. The
permanent members of the Security Council, in a clear-cut case that cried out for the
need for humanitarian intervention, were even reluctant to use the term genocide,
which would acknowledge the planned, systematic extermination of the Tutsi minor-
ity.56  Indeed, there was even a forewarning that extremist advocates of Hutu power
in the inner circle of the president of Rwanda were deliberately planning the exter-
mination of the Tutsis. This was based on information that was received as early as
January 1994 by General Dallaire from a highly placed informant in the Rwandan
government.57  Dallaire believed that if UNAMIR had numbered about 5,000, it
would have been possible to prevent the genocide.58
The Security Council did not provide UNAMIR with the resources that it needed
to accomplish its mission and consequently UNAMIR was unable to protect the
civilians and the refugees (as was the case with UNPROFOR — the United Nations
Protection Force — a year later in Srebrenica) that sought refuge with it.59  Further-
more, the original mandate of UNAMIR also limited its ability to protect people
because it was a traditional peacekeeping force created within the terms of chapter
VI, and therefore it could not use force except in conditions of self-defense. Addi-
tionally, the mandate of UNAMIR was not adjusted to take into account the rapidly
changing circumstances in Rwanda. As it became apparent (on April 21, 1994) that
mass killings were occurring, the Security Council reduced UNAMIR down to a
force of only 270 with a mandate to mediate an end to the dispute.60  Moreover, in
1993, the attention of the Security Council was also diverted by the fact that it was
overseeing two other major operations in Bosnia and Somalia, where the bulk of UN
forces were committed.61  Because of its setback in Somalia, the United States was
not willing to become involved in a much more horrendous war in Rwanda. There-
fore, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali believed that the United States shared a
considerable amount of the responsibility for the genocide in Rwanda. Given
Boutros-Ghali’s complaint that the Security Council was paying too much attention
to Europe and not enough to Africa, it is not surprising that the United States pre-
vented him from being elected to a second term as Secretary-General.62  By the time
it was clear that genocide was being committed, the Security Council finally
replaced UNAMIR with UNAMIR II, a larger force of about 5,500, which also was
a traditional chapter VI force but it never was fully deployed. Later, the Security
Council also authorized the French to launch “Operation Turquoise” with a chapter
VII mandate that, although designed to serve French interests and influence in the
region, nonetheless did save lives.63
In conclusion, the lessons learned from one of the darkest moments in the history
of the twentieth century, apart from the obvious lack of will on the part of the
United States to commit itself to assertive multilateralism, is the necessity for the
UN to possess the political analytical capabilities and an early warning system to
detect and act on an impending genocide, and to strengthen its capacity for preven-
tive diplomacy and the prevention of conflicts. But this cannot compensate or substi-
tute for the lack of political will, or the conclusion by a great power that it is not in
its national interest to act even in the face of genocide. The Independent Commis-
sion of Inquiry created by Secretary-General Kofi Annan concluded that genocide
prevention should comprise an essential component of any UN peacekeeping
operation (where relevant), and the International Tribunal for Rwanda, with a lot of
difficulty, has proceeded to convict individuals for committing genocide there.
Thousands of individuals in Rwanda have also been arrested and placed on trial as
well, although there is also much to criticize in the application of this model of
transitional justice.
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One of the most devastating setbacks in the entire history of UN peacekeeping
occurred in July 1995, in the former Yugoslavia, with the fall of the city of
Srebrenica, Bosnia, to Serbian forces. 64  In one of the greatest horrors of “ethnic
cleansing” (designated as genocide by the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia) that occurred during the wars of the Yugoslavian succession, approxi-
mately eight thousand Bosnian men and boys were executed in a brutal fashion,
described as “truly scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human his-
tory.”65  This occurred while a Dutch contingent of UNPROFOR (the United Nations
Protection Force) was on the scene. Srebrenica, along with several other Bosnian
cities and towns had been designated as a safe area by the UN in 1993, based on the
model of the safe area created in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi
government following the Gulf War. The concept of “safe-area” was not clearly
defined and could be viewed as an ill-conceived response by the Security Council to
international public opinion to “do something.” The application of the concept of the
“safe area” in Bosnia was an unmitigated disaster, because the members of the UN
did not have the political will to provide UNPROFOR with the resources that it
needed to adequately protect the civilians who sought refuge in the “safe areas.”
Bosnian Serb forces directly attacked this “safe area” of Srebrenica, as well as the
Dutch troops there, with impunity, taking some of them hostages as well. An inde-
pendent inquiry by the United Nations did not spare the UN itself from sharp criti-
cism for that disaster, one of the major factors that contributed to the withdrawal of
UNPROFOR from the former Yugoslavia and its replacement by a robust NATO
military force in 1995, as part of the Dayton Peace Accords.
One reason for the failure of the UN to protect the Bosnians, it is argued, is that
supposedly the UN never imagined that the Serbs would behave with such barbarism
(although atrocities were committed by all sides in the conflict) and cruelty, a bru-
tality that Europe had not seen since the Second World War.66  Probably one of the
most telling criticisms of the inability of the UN to protect the Bosnians was the
UN’s failure to effectively use NATO airpower to stop the advancing Serb troops, as
they moved in on Srebrenica.67  As UN peacekeeping operations became more com-
plex, the coordination of military with civilian decision-making became more diffi-
cult. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General also had to deal with the
UN bureaucracy in New York in making a decision to use airpower. Furthermore,
Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General at the time, also writes in his memoirs that the
Dutch Minister of Defense vetoed the use of NATO air power because of the fear
that the Dutch troops who had been taken hostage by the Serbs would be injured.68
In addition, there was a fear that if robust air power were used, it would jeopardize
the chances of reaching a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Boutros-Ghali also
blames the Americans for encouraging the Bosnians to turn down the Vance-Owen
Pact, which called for the division of Bosnia into a number of cantons.69  This pro-
vided the Bosnian Serbs with an incentive70  to attack the “safe areas” that had been
designated in Bosnia by the UN Security Council in 1993 (which were poorly con-
ceived and ill-defined concepts in the first place) in order to gain more territory.71
Furthermore, as the UN’s own investigation pointed out, another reason for the
failure in Srebrenica was the institutional ideology of the UN, which stressed the
avoidance of becoming involved in a militaristic “culture of death,” since the UN
traditionally was supposed to function as an impartial force that was not to engage in
war-making.72  According to Boutros-Ghali, “the UN forces in the ‘safe areas’ were
there as peacekeepers, and they had neither the authority nor the means to do battle
with the parties to the conflict.”73  The rules of engagement and mandate of the UN
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forces on the scene needed to be changed in order to allow them to engage in robust
military action, but neither the will nor the resources of Dutchbat, which consisted
of about three hundred combat soldiers at the time, were sufficient.74  The Dutch
forces were not sufficient to deter the one to two thousand heavily armed Serbs who
advanced on Srebrenica, or to prevent the slaughter that took place. But in August
2001, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague convicted
Bosnian Serbian General Radislav Krstic of genocide in Srebrenica and sentenced
him to over forty years in prison. This was the first conviction for the acts of geno-
cide that were committed at Srbrenica. Former Yugoslavian President Slobodan
Milosevic, who was ousted by the Serbs in a revolution in October 2000, was also
delivered to The Hague and placed on trial for the crimes committed in Srebrenia,
among other charges.
Resurgence of UN Peacekeeping
During the 1990s, after the failures in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, there was
a downsizing of UN peacekeeping as the number of blue helmets in the field was
reduced from over 70,000 to 14,000. But by 1999 there was a sudden surge in de-
mand for UN peacekeeping, and a willingness on the part of Secretary-General Kofi
Annan to meet these challenges as the new millennium dawned. There was a surpris-
ing expansion of UN peacekeeping efforts on the part of the Secretary-General that
reversed the previous trend in downsizing. In the last few years of the twentieth
century, the UN faced a surge in traditional and post-conflict peacekeeping demands
in places like Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Southern Lebanon, and Palestine (where the Palestin-
ians unsuccessfully requested that the UN send an international observer force into
the occupied territories).75
 Following NATO intervention in Kosovo, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 1244 that authorized the creation of UNIKOM (the United Nations Interim
Administration in Kosovo), and the UN, supported by NATO forces, stepped in to
administer the province as a sort of international protectorate, and to prepare it for
“substantial autonomy.”76  NATO supposedly intervened in Kosovo in 1999 to engage
in a humanitarian mission designed to rescue the Albanian minority that was being
subjected to horrific ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces.77  As the conflict unfolded,
there initially were unsubstantiated estimates that as many as 100,000 Albanians had
been killed, but a more realistic figure was between 5,000 and 10,000.78  Kosovo
raised the question of when a humanitarian intervention should take precedence over
the traditional notion of sovereignty, and whether a regional military alliance like
NATO had an obligation to act when the Security Council could not because it was
divided. UNIKOM was given the task of rebuilding civil society, supervising the
return of refugees, disarming the Albanian National Liberation Army and incorpo-
rating them into a civilian police force, and overseeing elections along with the
OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and EU (Euro-
pean Union), backed by the KFOR forces of NATO. But now, four years later,
UNIKOM’s peace-building efforts in Kosovo, buttressed by an International Civilian
Police force, have been far from successful, as the Albanians there have engaged in
their own version of ethnic cleansing of Serbs, and extremist Albanian forces report-
edly used Kosovo as a base of operations to launch an attack on the neighboring
government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001. A European
Union force was dispatched to Macedonia in 2003 to help maintain the Ohrid peace
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agreement that had brought an end to the conflict.
The UN suffered yet another setback in the case of its operations in Sierra Leone,
a West African country that had been involved in a devastating civil war since 1992,
as various warlords competed with one another for power. UNAMSIL (United Na-
tions Mission in Sierra Leone) was established in 1999, under chapter 7 of the UN
Charter, to help implement a peace accord (the Lome Accord) and to take over from
a subregional organization (the Economic Community of West African States) and
its military arm known as the Economic Community of West African States Moni-
toring Group, as well as a small contingent of UN observers that had been dis-
patched to Sierra Leone previously. In spite of all of the peacekeeping failures,
which the UN had suffered beforehand, and with no emphasis on the lessons that
should be learned from these failures, initially the deployment of the UNASMIL
was a model of what not to do.79  Five hundred ill-prepared and ill-equipped
UNASMIL peacekeepers were taken hostage in May 1999 by RUF (Revolutionary
United Front) rebel forces, and the reputation of UN peacekeeping suffered yet
another humiliating setback. This was compounded by the inability of UNASMIL to
oversee the return of refugees to Sierra Leone, and the spillover of the conflict to
the neighboring state of Guinea. In order to prevent the government from falling, it
was necessary for British forces to intervene in Sierra Leone. By 2001, the situation
had stabilized to the extent that an expanded UNASMIL and government forces
claimed considerable progress in disarming the anti-government RUF, as the govern-
ment began to reestablish its control over the critical diamond mining areas. In 2003
there were plans to downsize UNASMIL, and it was even possible for it to lend
troops for a peacekeeping operation in nearby Liberia.
These new challenges at the end of the millennium called for forms of humanitar-
ian intervention as well as the expansion of or deployment of peacekeeping and
peace-enforcement forces of a more traditional nature.80  Humanitarian intervention
is based on the Annan doctrine of the “two sovereignties,” in which the UN Secre-
tary-General argued that the sovereignty of the individual should take precedence
over the sovereignty of the state.81  This doctrine is based on the need for the inter-
national community to intervene within a state to protect the human rights of mi-
norities from gross and massive violations committed against them by their own
government.
 Besides the more complex and multidimensional humanitarian intervention, the
UN also found itself involved in more traditional peacekeeping operations. For ex-
ample, the UN was called upon to put together a force of about 4000 observers to
oversee an armistice and maintain a temporary security zone that had been estab-
lished between Ethiopia and Eritrea, hoping to help to bring an end to the conflict
that had been raging there since 1998.82  The Secretary-General also had to quickly
expand UNIFIL (the United Nations Force in Lebanon) in 2000, a force that had
been deployed in Southern Lebanon since 1978. It was necessary to do this because
of the precipitous Israeli withdrawal from the area in 2000, which created a power
vacuum right at the Israeli-Lebanese demarcation line, the Blue Line, that had been
filled by fundamentalist Islamic groups such as the Hezbollah, raising the danger of
increased clashes with Israeli forces, although by 2003, UNIFIL also was
downsized.
The Regionalization of UN Peacekeeping
One approach that has developed to compensate for the ineffective peacekeeping
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record of the UN, as the UN has found itself overstretched and starved of resources,
is the regionalization of peacekeeping.
In the 1990s, as the UN engaged in more complex, multidimensional peacekeep-
ing operations, it found itself increasingly relying on regional and subregional orga-
nizations and arrangements to maintain peace and security and restore order in zones
of turmoil by stabilizing the spate of regional conflicts (some of them protracted
conflicts that had been going on for years) that had erupted at the end of the Cold
War.83  Regionalism has always been an important ingredient of the UN system.84
According to the UN Charter, regional organizations can act in self-defense, but they
must report to the Security Council, and they cannot engage in action without the
authorization of the Security Council. NATO, however, which has been involved in
a number of peacekeeping operations in the Balkans in the 1990s as it has redefined
itself and undergone a transformation from a collective defense to a collective secu-
rity organization, claims that it is legally not considered a regional organization, but
rather is a military alliance, which does not need the authorization of the Security
Council to engage in humanitarian intervention.85  Peacekeeping by regional and
subregional organizations and arrangements has both advantages and disadvantages,
as does reliance on “coalitions of the willing” led by regional hegemons. “Coalitions
of the willing” (in place of traditional peacekeeping forces) have been led by re-
gional/global hegemons such as the United States in Haiti, France in Rwanda (as
well as in the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003), Rus-
sia in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Australia in East Timor.86
More recently, the EU has become more active in out-of-area peacekeeping opera-
tions. An EU police force replaced the UN in Bosnia, and an EU force led by France
was deployed in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the
summer of 2003. This EU mission, which was approved by the Security Council at
the end of May 2003, officially terminated its mission on September 1, 2003. This
was the first time that an EU mission had been sent outside of Europe.
“Coalitions of the willing,” however, may not be a good solution to the
problematique of effective peacekeeping, because they seem rather reminiscent of
the old colonial practice of dividing the world into spheres of influence, which al-
low global and regional hegemons to assert their dominance of adjacent geographi-
cal areas.87  Furthermore, a “coalition of the willing” sent to deal with a conflict in a
region can take place outside the framework of an existing regional organization.
 But a danger is that reliance on regional as well as subregional organizations may
provide regional hegemons with the opportunity to extend their influence in the
region with the legitimization and blessing of the international community. Regional
organizations must act within the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter and in a
manner that does not undermine the primacy of the Security Council as an instru-
ment of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Nonetheless, the advantage of relying
on regional organizations to engage in peacekeeping operations is that regional pow-
ers may be more familiar with the local conditions and circumstances that affect the
conflict and may have a better understanding of the issues that are involved. But a
regional organization may not possess the necessary resources and capacity for
peacekeeping. Furthermore, a number of states that donate troops to regional peace-
keeping operations are poor, developing countries, and a certain amount of donor
exhaustion has set in because the UN has lacked the financial resources to compen-
sate troop-contributing countries in a timely fashion, which results in difficulty in
recruiting troops for new peacekeeping operations. In the case of developing coun-
tries, the UN could offer its expertise and experience to help them participate in
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regional peacekeeping operations. Additionally, some regional organizations may not
follow UN norms of behavior, as troops may not be adequately trained, and may
engage in behavior that may add to the problems that a country faces (such as en-
gaging in criminal behavior, spreading AIDS), although this is also true of troops
from industrial democracies as well. Troops need to be trained in following interna-
tional humanitarian norms and be sensitized to gender mainstream issues as well,
especially since women often are the main victims of civil conflicts. Finally, one of
the greatest dangers associated with the trend toward the growing regionalization of
UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement is the marginalization of the United
Nations, with the trend of increasing reliance on regional and subregional
organizations.
Sanctions
What some would consider to be the failure of UN peacekeeping and peace enforce-
ment in the 1990s resulted in an increased reliance on sanctions, which can be seen
as a form of coercive diplomacy and which represents a negative form of action that
can be used for purposes of both deterring and compelling. For example, a conflict
considered to be ended may restart, and efforts at post-conflict peacekeeping may
suffer a setback, so it may be necessary to impose or reimpose sanctions on a state or
sub-state actor such as the leaders of a revolutionary organization, to attempt to
coerce them to comply with a cease-fire or peace agreement that they already
signed.
As far as the implementation of collective security is concerned, sanctions are,
according to Inis Claude, Jr., “the first line of attack.”88  All members of the UN are
expected to comply with sanctions, since according to article 25 of the Charter, they
are obligated to carry out decisions of the Security Council. The United Nations has
discovered in the post–Cold War period, however, that it further needed to refine
and improve upon the application of sanctions, in order to deal with the growing
“culture of impunity” that characterized the behavior of sundry war criminals and
governments, who flouted the norms and the will of the international community.
Sanctions constitute the heart of a collective security system of an organization like
the United Nations and provide for a graduated series of measures that can be ap-
plied against international lawbreakers. Sanctions involve economic measures such
as trade and financial restrictions (such as the freezing of the foreign assets of
targeted elites and leaders), the interruption of relations with the international com-
munity by air and sea (as applied against Libya and Afghanistan), as well as the
imposition of travel restrictions on the targeted leaders and their families.89  A num-
ber of developing countries, however, even object to the use of smart sanctions,
because they believe that they are used to advance the hegemonic interests of states
like the United States, especially against states identified by Washington as rogue
states.
At first, economic sanctions were seen as a relatively humane means of trying to
force an international lawmaker to comply with the will of the international commu-
nity, but in reality the application of economic sanctions against a society can be
quite devastating in terms of the effects it may have upon innocent civilians, hence
the need for “smart sanctions.” Sanctions can be rather indiscriminate in their
effects, a problem that Annan refers to as the “paradox of sanctions.”90  But a
tyrannical regime may deliberately manipulate the effects of sanctions in order to
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gain the sympathy of international public opinion. In the case of Iraq, for example,
the UN decided for humanitarian reasons to provide relief to Baghdad in the form of
the “oil for food” program, which allowed Iraq to sell its oil abroad under condi-
tions monitored by the UN, to buy food and medical supplies, although some of the
income earned from the sale of Iraqi oil was also used to compensate claims against
the Iraqi government stemming from the Gulf war.91  But at times, Iraq withheld the
sale of oil as a pressure tactic on the UN, to protest the prolongation of the sanctions
regime, which had been in place for over a decade.92  After the second Gulf War, the
UN made arrangements to phase out the “oil for food” program. Furthermore, in the
1990s in other cases, the UN found that it had to take steps to prevent lawbreaking
governments and warlords from profiting from the sale of gems such as diamonds
and emeralds, precious minerals such as cobalt and colton, timber, elephant tusks,
drugs, and even the looting of banks, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, which provides the resources that permits international lawbreakers to
buy the weapons and small arms that allow protracted regional conflicts to con-
tinue.93
The UN, therefore, has attempted to apply “smart sanctions” against political
leaders and warlords, in such states as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, to prevent them, for example, from profiting from the
sale of diamonds. For example, in the year 2000, the Security Council held a series
of meetings with representatives of the worldwide diamond industry, such as the
recently established World Diamond Council (created by the giant diamond com-
pany DeBeers), to deal with the global trade in illicit uncut diamonds,94  to make it
more difficult for such groups as the RUF and UNITA (The National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola) in Angola to profit from the sale of diamonds.95  The
way to control the trade in such conflict diamonds is to control their export to the
outside world through a system of international certificates of origin.96  But there has
been some opposition to setting up an international regime that could effectively
control the sale and smuggling of such conflict diamonds. For example, India, a
major diamond processing center, has argued that any international regime that is set
up should not impede the legal diamond trade.97  The Russians also were concerned
that efforts to deal with this problem could destroy the legal diamond market.98
Nonetheless, the Security Council has adopted resolutions that have imposed sanc-
tions regimes on Sierra Leone and Angola to control the export of “blood”
diamonds.99 South Africa, which is one of the world’s largest centers of diamond
mining activities, also initiated a resolution, which was adopted at the fifty-fifth
session of the General Assembly, setting up an international certificate of origin
scheme in order to be able to tell the difference between conflict diamonds and le-
gitimate diamonds. But it is possible to circumvent the international regime set up to
control the flow of conflict diamonds by selling the diamonds through third coun-
tries that are not covered by an embargo.100  UNITA has sold its diamonds through
Burkino Fasa, and Sierra Leone has through Liberia. To tighten up the sanctions
regime in order to prevent such smuggling, the UN has also imposed sanctions
against the sale of diamonds from such countries as Liberia, a conduit for the export
of such diamonds, and has provided the rebels in Sierra Leone with weapons in
exchange. But it is difficult to control the smuggling of diamonds. For example,
about $3 billion worth of diamonds are smuggled into Antwerp, which does a total
business of about $23 billion a year. Besides regulating blood diamonds, the UN has
also tried to deal with the looting of a country like the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, not only by rebels but by invading armies as well as by multinational corpo-
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rations, that may be a factor in the unnecessary prolongation of the conflict there.
Finally, sanctions regimes may be weakened because third states that comply with
UN sanctions in good faith may suffer economic damage without being adequately
compensated by the international community, as the UN has greatly expanded the
number of sanctions regimes that it instituted in the decade following the end of the
Cold War. Article 50 of the UN Charter is somewhat ambiguous as to how states are
to be compensated. 101  In conclusion, the 1990s has been known as the “sanctions
decade,” as efforts were made to refine their application because they were used as
“blunt instruments” in the past.
The War Against Terror, Afghanistan,
Iraq, and UN Peacekeeping
Following 9/11, the UN had expressed its sympathy to the US, and UN Resolution
56/1 condemned the terrorist attacks against the United States. The United
Nations urged it member states to take action on the national level to deal with ter-
rorism. A Security Council Committee on Counter-Terrorism was created to monitor
the actions that members were taking to deal with terrorism.102  Members of the
United Nations were also urged to ratify the twelve existing so-called sector conven-
tions, dealing with terrorism, that had been adopted by various UN agencies over the
past four decades. They deal with such issues as the hijacking of aircraft, attacks
against diplomats, the taking of hostages, acts of terrorism on the high seas, and the
protection of nuclear materials, among other things. After 9/11, the UN General
Assembly also considered the adoption of a comprehensive convention dealing with
terrorism. But given the rather controversial nature of arriving at a mutually accept-
able definition of terrorism, not every member of the international community was
solidly behind the adoption of an omnibus resolution in the General Assembly. By
2003, it still remained to be adopted.
As we have already seen, the inability of the UN to deal effectively with ethnic
cleansing and genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda had weakened its role further as an
instrument of peacekeeping in the world political system. Moreover, the role of the
UN was also marginalized when the United States functioned as a global hegemon in
waging the war against terrorism, seeking, if possible, legitimation for its military
operations but prepared to act unilaterally or in concert with some of its closest
allies in a “coalition of the willing.”
In the case of Afghanistan, a “coalition of the willing” had been sanctioned by a
UN mandate in the form of Security Council Resolution 1386(2001) as Secretary-
General Kofi Annan had made it clear that the United Nations did not have the
 resources to put a UN peacekeeping force of blue helmets into Afghanistan. In De-
cember 2001, mostly US forces and the British, with the aid of various groups and
warlords in Afghanistan such as the Northern Alliance, had temporarily crushed the
Taliban and Al Qaeda in the war. After some equivocation about the possibility of
restoring the exiled Afghan King Mohammad Zaher Shah to power, a conference
was held by the international community in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001.
The supposed purpose of the so-called Bonn process was to create a government that
could enjoy the support of the diverse ethnic and tribal groups in Afghanistan, espe-
cially one of the most important tribes known as the Pashtuns. Most importantly for
our purposes here, the Bonn process also called for the creation of an international
security force to be deployed in the Afghan capital of Kabul and the surrounding
areas. Therefore, in December 2001, the Security Council voted unanimously for
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the creation of a multinational force (not a UN peacekeeping force) that was dubbed
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).103  The United States, however,
opposed giving ISAF the mandate to operate outside of Kabul and its environs,
because Washington did not want the force to interfere with its operations in Af-
ghanistan. This provided a model of two separate forces operating in the country.
The United Kingdom played a key role in assembling the force, which by mid-
August 2003 numbered about 5000.104  ISAF was to be commanded by a “lead”
nations, or nations, that rotated every six months.105  The force was originally led by
the United Kingdom and Turkey, and then by Germany and the Netherlands. It was
also considered to be of critical importance that Turkey participate in the force, to
underscore the fact that the military action in Afghanistan should not be interpreted
as a war against Islam, cast in the mold of Huntington’s war of civilizations. It is
important to point out that the ISAF was not a traditional UN force, but fit into the
model of a new “generation” of multinational forces, authorized by the Security
Council.
In June 2003, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping argued that ISAF
should be expanded throughout the country, which he claimed would be easier to do
under NATO command.106  At the time, it also appeared that the central Afghan gov-
ernment, led by Hamid Karzai, was losing control of some of the regions of the
country, for it became increasingly more dangerous for the UN Mission in Afghani-
stan to operate in parts of the country that had reverted to the control of Afghan
warlords, some quite hostile to the United States and to the central government. The
growing chaos, as Afghanistan struggled to put together a national army capable of
maintaining order, further undermined efforts to hold elections, draw up a constitu-
tion, and engage in reconstruction. Moreover, the full amount of the financial aid
that had been promised to Afghanistan at the Bonn conference was never forthcom-
ing.
On August 11, 2003, ISAF was placed under the command of NATO, ostensibly
to eliminate the difficulties of finding states that were willing to serve as lead states
commanding the multinational force.107  The transformation of ISAF into a NATO
force provided the military alliance with a base in central Asia, close to the Caspian
Sea and the Middle East.
 Iraq
The ability of the United Nations to function as an effective instrument of war-
prevention and peacekeeping was seriously tested in the spring of 2003, when the
United States launched what it dubbed a preemptive (but really preventive) war
against Iraq. The avowed purpose of the war was to engage in “regime change” in
order to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, which Washington claimed
posed a threat to the national security of the United States. Saddam Hussein was
demonized and painted as an evil tyrant who had not only used Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) against Iran during the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-88) but also
against his own people. As the United States tried to make the case before the inter-
national community, the main rationale for the war was that it constituted part and
parcel of the “war against terror.” But the Bush administration was never able to
provide the facts to establish that a definitive link existed between Hussein and Al
Qaeda.108  The war against terror was presented by Washington as an unconventional
and asymmetrical war that was global and was aimed at destroying Al Qaeda’s ter-
rorist networks and cells around the world, which reportedly were operating in
approximately sixty countries. According to Washington, the war against terror was
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not to be confined to Afghanistan, but was extended as well to states that the admin-
istration claimed were protecting and aiding terrorists. Washington was following
the new strategic doctrine of preemption that had been unveiled in the National
Security Strategy of September 2002. This replaced the decades-old doctrine of
deterrence and containment, which essentially was a Cold War doctrine designed to
prevent a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Because the main rationale for the war presented by the United States was the
need to disarm Iraq of its WMD that supposedly posed a threat not only to the na-
tional security of the United States but to the maintenance of international peace and
security as well,109  an effort was also made to portray the war as a “just war.”110  A
U.S. military buildup in the Gulf region in 2002 put tremendous pressure on Iraq to
accept the return of a team of reconstituted UN inspectors known as UNMOVIC (the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission), led by Hans
Blix as its executive chairman, to replace the inspectors who had to leave Iraq in
1998. The application of U.S. coercive diplomacy resulted in negotiations between
Iraq and the UN in Vienna in which the return of the inspectors was agreed to.
UNMOVIC was to deal with chemical and bacteriological weapons as well as mis-
siles, while the IAEA would deal with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The Bush
administration placed an enormous amount of pressure on the Security Council to
make an effective system of inspections work, which would ensure that Iraq was in
compliance with all of the relevant resolutions that had been adopted by the Security
Council since the first Gulf War. In his speech to the United Nations on September
12, 2002, President Bush, in effect, threw down the gauntlet to the Security Coun-
cil, claiming that Iraq had ignored all of the previous Security Council resolutions
adopted over the past twelve years.111  This could also be seen as an effort by Wash-
ington to buy time until its military forces were ready to attack Iraq. But before
launching a “preemptive” strike, Bush was prevailed upon by the Secretary of State
Colin Powell to give the UN one last chance before the dogs of war were un-
leashed.112
The majority of the international community opposed a war against Iraq. Most of
the members of the UN emphasized that every diplomatic opportunity should be
exhausted to resolve the crisis, and that war should only be considered as a last
resort. Furthermore, in the debate that took place in the Security Council on October
17, 2002, a number of delegates, especially the French, also stressed the broader
ramifications of the manner in which the crisis was resolved, not only for the United
Nations, but for the entire international system as well.113  Clearly, the authority and
the credibility of the United Nations were at stake, and there was the fear that the
United Nations had failed to maintain international order just as the League of
Nations had failed as an instrument of collective security in the interwar period.
The “last chance” for Iraq, took the form of the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, which was the product of about two months
of intensive negotiations.114  It stated that Iraq was in “material breach” of previous
Security Council resolutions and that “serious consequences” would follow if
Baghdad did not cooperate fully with the enhanced and strengthened UN and IAEA
inspection teams, which were expected to function in an impartial and objective
manner. Resolution 1441 provided the inspectors with unimpeded access to sites
such as the presidential palaces, which had previously been off limits. Inspectors
also had the right to interview Iraqi experts who had been involved in the develop-
ment of WMD, although they encountered a fair amount of obstruction from the
Iraqi government. Furthermore, Iraq was given thirty days from the date of the
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adoption of the resolution to issue a declaration providing accurate information
vis-à-vis the status of its programs of WMD. Any falsehood or misrepresentation in
the declaration would be considered as a “material breach” and therefore could be
followed by “serious consequences,” which were not defined anywhere but everyone
assumed that it meant the application of military force.
The United States, although a co-sponsor of the resolution, had been reluctant to
bring the matter back to the Security Council in the first place, but the negotiations
involved in the drafting of the resolution probably did allow it to buy some further
time to continue its military buildup in the region. The unanimous adoption of the
resolution was designed to convey to Iraq the sense of unity of the Security Council
and the international community. The resolution was also based on the idea ex-
pressed by a number of delegations, that all diplomatic means had to be exhausted
before military force could be used. France, in particular, stressed that the resolution
set up a two-step process that did not include an automatic trigger that would autho-
rize the use of military force.115  According to Washington, though, “material
breaches” of Security Council resolutions 678 and 687 had already nullified the
cease-fire that had been in place since 1991. According to the French interpretation
of resolution 1441, the first step of the resolution defined the conditions that Iraq
had to meet, setting up the “rules of the game,” based on full proactive Iraqi coop-
eration with the inspectors who would report back to the Security Council. The
second step would consist of holding another Security Council meeting to consider
the course of action in the face of Iraqi material breach and non-compliance, which
even the French conceded would not exclude “any alternative.” The Secretary-
General hailed the adoption of the resolution as a decision that had strengthened the
role of the Security Council and the United Nations in the international system.116
But he also added that “this is a time of trial for Iraq, for the United Nations, and
the world.”117
In comparison to the United States and the United Kingdom, the three other per-
manent members of the Security Council (France, China, and Russia) were opposed
to the Security Council adopting a follow-up resolution authorizing the United
States to use military force and lead a “coalition of the willing” against Iraq. At the
time, the unanimous adoption of resolution 1441 was hailed by most members of the
UN as a step that showed the resolve and unity of the international community and
strengthened the role and the credibility of the UN as an actor in the international
system. In broader terms, it also fit in with the overall strategy of states like France,
a grand strategy designed to use UN institutions like the Security Council as part of
a plan to construct a multipolar balance of states in the international system to check
the power of the United States as a global hegemon.
But from the U.S. point of view, a 12,000-page declaration that was issued by
Iraq on December 7, 2002, that purported to comply with the terms of resolution
1441 was not satisfactory. Washington claimed that it was inaccurate, and contained
material from previous reports, as the Iraqi government continued to argue that it
possessed no weapons of mass destruction
On the other hand, Hans Blix of UNMOVIC seemed to be at loggerheads with the
Bush administration on this issue. On January 27, 2003, the Security Council met to
consider the reports of Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. For example, Blix stated on January 27, 2003,
that the Iraqi declaration contained “a good deal of new information,” that dealt with
“missiles and biotechnology.”118  He also focused on some problems that needed to be
resolved from the previous war, such as the disposition of such biological weapons
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as anthrax and vx, as well as chemical weapon shells.119  Blix also expressed his
concern about the production of missiles by Iraq that exceeded the permissible UN
range of 150 kilometers120  (although Iraq later destroyed some of them). But Blix
also stressed that Iraq was cooperating with the UNMOVIC inspectors and that the
inspectors should be given more time before there was a rush to war.
Mohamed ElBaradei also flatly stated, in stark contrast to the Bush administra-
tion, in his testimony before the Security Council on January 27, 2003, that his
“agency had found no evidence that Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons
programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s.”121  Given time, the
IAEA could provide “credible assurance” that Iraq was not involved in a nuclear
weapons program. Furthermore, ElBaradei disagreed with the Bush administration
that aluminum tubing that had been purchased by Iraq could be used to construct
nuclear centrifuges.122
Nonetheless, on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the
U.S. case that Iraq was continuing its WMD program in defiance of the international
community, and that Iraq was therefore in material breach of resolution 1441, as
well as previous UN resolutions that had been adopted on the matter.123  A series of
arguments were presented by the Bush administration as to why it was thought nec-
essary to launch a preemptive war against Iraq. Powell argued that “Saddam Hussein
was determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction and make more,”124  and
that the “United States could not take the risk that these weapons would be used
against the American people at some point.”125
But in March 2003, the United States was unable to secure the adoption by the
necessary majority of nine out of fifteen votes, of a draft resolution (co-sponsored
by Spain and the United Kingdom) authorizing military action as a follow-up to
resolution 1441. This represented an unsuccessful American effort to secure collec-
tive legitimation for the launching of a preemptive war against Iraq. A number of
leading international lawyers argued that such an attack would constitute a violation
of international law and a violation of the obligations it held under the Charter as a
member of the UN. For instance, article 2, section 4, of the Charter prohibits the use
or the threat of the use of force against a state.126
One of the arguments made by the supporters of the Bush administration was that
the United States, as a sovereign state, had the right to engage in self-defense. In-
deed, article 51 of the UN Charter establishes this right, which gives a state the right
of self-defense against an armed attack, but stipulates that this has to be subsequently
approved by the Security Council.127  But as also stipulated in article 51, self-defense
could only be exercised after an armed attack had occurred, as opposed to the doc-
trine of anticipatory self-defense that was presented by the Bush administration to
justify military action undertaken against an imminent threat.128
In March 2003, though, there was no evidence that Iraq had been involved in the
9/11 attack on the United States. At least in the eyes of its critics, the United States
had not definitively established the existence of ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda.129
The Bush administration also argued that Iraq was in material breach of Security
Council resolutions 678 and 687.130  Washington believed apparently that the charge
of material breach provided it with the justification to argue that the cease-fire that
had been established in resolution 678 should be considered suspended, and that it
could use all means necessary to deal with the breach as called for in that resolution.
Spain, which had been one of the staunchest supporters of the Bush administration
and one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution calling for military action as a
follow-up to resolution 1441, also argued in the Security Council on March 19,
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2003, that resolution 687, legitimizing all means necessary to ensure Iraqi compli-
ance was still in effect and had only been held in abeyance since the adoption of the
cease-fire called for in resolution 678.
But the Russian Federation, France, and China plus non-permanent member of
the Security Council Germany opposed the use of military force to secure Iraqi
compliance.131  German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, after pointing out that
Germany had willingly participated in the “war against terrorism” in the ISAF (In-
ternational Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, raised the question as to
whether “the problem which the UN encountered in working towards the disarma-
ment of Iraq, should seriously be regarded as grounds for war with all of its terrible
consequences.”132  Germany further argued that there was “no basis in the UN
Charter for regime change by military means.”133  The German foreign minister
concluded that “we do not live on Venus but rather we are survivors of Mars.”134  The
Russian Federation stressed that resolution 1441 gave “no one the right to the auto-
matic use of force.”135  France threatened to veto any resolution that authorized the
use of military force against Iraq, stressing that “war can only be a last resort, while
collective responsibility remains the rule.”136  It is also important to point out that
China, another permanent member of the Security Council, opposed the use of mili-
tary force against Iraq as a follow-up to resolution 1441.
A majority of the members of the UN opposed the war. At a meeting of the Secu-
rity Council on March 12, 2003, most of the African members of the General
Assembly expressed their opposition to the war, unless the use of force was sanc-
tioned by the Security Council. The African states were concerned not only about
the fact that the unilateral use of military force would constitute a violation of inter-
national law and the UN Charter, but also would have adverse economic conse-
quences for the continent as well. Earlier, on February 3, 2003, the African Union
had stressed that “multilateral cooperation was the only option.”137  Furthermore, the
United States was urged by the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Arab League not to rush into war.
Earlier in the debate, Arab states such as Lebanon had emphasized what it consid-
ered to be the double-standard that was followed by the United States in tolerating
Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, while advocating the use of military force to
disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.138  It should also be pointed out,
however, that there were a number of countries, such as Albania, Japan, El Salvador,
Georgia, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Latvia, that did support
the position of the United States.139
Operating under the threat of a French veto, the United States engaged in a fre-
netic amount of diplomatic activity to gather up the necessary majority of nine votes
out of fifteen for a resolution to gain some semblance of legitimacy for military
action, by attempting to persuade some of the non-permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council to vote for it. Spain and Bulgaria were aligned with the United States
on this issue, but other non-permanent members such as Mexico, Angola, and
Cameroon, aligned themselves with the French position, and would not vote for the
adoption of a resolution calling for the use of force against Iraq.
Not being able to secure the adoption of the resolution authorizing the use of
force, the United States and the United Kingdom launched the war against Iraq in
March 2003 without any authorization from the Security Council. At a Security
Council meeting on March 26, 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his
“profound . . . sadness” and sympathy for the Iraqi people. In the postwar stage of
the crisis, attention was focused on the restoration of the unity of the Security Coun-
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cil, which had been fractured by the divisions over the Iraqi war, and in a broader
sense to restore the central role of the Security Council as a major actor in the inter-
national system in the maintenance of international peace and security. Before the
war had been launched, Kofi Annan had warned the United States that it might need
the UN later, a prediction that turned out to be quite true. But Annan had stated on
August 22, 2003, that UN blue helmets “would not take over from the coalition,
since it did not have the resources to do so, but broached the idea of a Security
Council mandated force,” a multinational force. The coalition occupying Iraq, which
consisted of the United States, the UK, and a few other allied states, would need a
UN “umbrella” or mandate to persuade states like France (already somewhat over-
extended in other UN peacekeeping ventures in 2003), Germany, and Russia to par-
ticipate in a “post-conflict” stabilization force. This task was complicated by the
failure of the Bush administration to initially secure collective legitimation from the
UN for going to war.
As resistance to the coalition occupation force in Iraq mounted, the United States
found that France, Germany, Russia, India, and Pakistan, were not willing to inter-
nationalize an occupation force without Security Council authorization, a timetable
to restore Iraqi sovereignty, and a greater role in the administration of postwar
Iraq.140  In the fall of 2003, negotiations were still continuing on the terms and con-
ditions concerning the adoption of a Security Council resolution that would serve as
the basis for a multinational force in Iraq. There were some countries that indicated
that they would be willing to help the United States in Iraq, including the “new”
Europeans such as the former communist states of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Romania, as well as Spain, among others. But obviously,
these countries did not have the military capacity that larger powers such as the
“old” Europeans like France and Germany could bring to bear.141  In sum, the effects
of the Second Gulf War on the concept of UN peacekeeping might best be summed
up by a statement made by Germany at the 4,818th meeting of the Security Council
on August 23, 2003, that “peacekeeping by its very nature must remain compatible
with the universal role of the UN and the principle of international solidarity.”
The Reform of UN Peacekeeping:
Conclusion
The dark memories of Rwanda and Srebrenica have also propelled the United
Nations in the direction of finding ways to improve its capacity to engage in peace-
keeping.142  Also, the second Gulf War has again raised the issue of creating a perma-
nent standing force for the UN, as called for in the UN Charter, as discussed in the
introductory section of this work. But the members of the UN still would be reluc-
tant to surrender their sovereignty over their military forces to such an international
organization. Moreover, there is no desire either to create an international force of
mercenaries that could be quickly dispatched to a conflict, a sort of international
French Foreign Legion that owed its allegiance to no state but to the United
Nations.143
Since peacekeeping represents an ad hoc invention, the UN will have to continue
to improvise. The best that the UN can do is to deal with more recent reform pro-
posals that have emphasized the need for a greater degree of transparency in making
peacekeeping and sanctions decisions (some developing countries believe that the
imposition of sanctions against Third World states represent a form of discrimina-
tion), more input from the General Assembly that developing countries consider a
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much more democratic institution than the Security Council, and more focus on
clear entrance and exit strategies when a peacekeeping operation is originally man-
dated. Furthermore, a blue-ribbon Panel of Experts on Peacekeeping  submitted a
report in August 2000 (the Brahimi Report) that recommended a number of steps,
including strengthening the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which
has been greatly under-financed and understaffed.
After the second Gulf War, Secretary-General Annan urged that the time had
arrived for major institutional reforms in the structure of the world organization. An
increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the Security
Council, which has been discussed at the UN for years, would certainly democratize
and make the Security Council more representative, perhaps generating enhanced
legitimacy for its peacekeeping operations. In connection with an expansion of the
Security Council, it has been suggested that the Military Staff Committee, which has
been mostly moribund since its creation, could be expanded to include more repre-
sentatives of the Third World, and could then function in an advisory capacity on
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement issues. In an effort to improve its capacity to
function as a more effective instrument of peacekeeping, the Security Council has
undertaken more fact-finding field missions within the past few years to conflict-
ridden areas, and has engaged in open discussions on various facets of improving
peacekeeping (such as the need to consult more with troop-contributing countries
about questions dealing with the renewal of a mandate or the termination of an
operation).
The UN has also put more emphasis on the need to prevent conflicts and potential
conflicts from developing, before they escalate out of control. It has also been sug-
gested that the Secretary-General should make greater use of his prerogatives under
article 99 of the Charter (to bring to the Security Council an issue that threatens the
maintenance of international peace and security) although this does carry with it the
risk of a confrontation with a permanent member of the Security Council, as Dag
Hammarskjold discovered during the Congo crisis.144  As the Secretary-General
stressed in a recent report on conflict prevention, the responsibility of preventing
conflicts rests with the national governments themselves.145  The preventive deploy-
ment of troops based on the model of UNPREDEP (the UN Preventive Deployment
Force) in Macedonia — which may have helped to contain the turmoil in Serbia
from spilling over into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia before it was
withdrawn — is another possible model for conflict prevention in war-ridden re-
gions of the world.146  Even though the UN has now realized that it cannot bring
peace to an area unless the parties to a dispute want it themselves, it has been sug-
gested that the UN should enhance its capacity to utilize early-warning systems to
alert the international community to a crisis escalating out of control. The Depart-
ment of Political Affairs in the Secretariat has the responsibility of monitoring crises
and potential crises and should be able to indicate when a situation is going to esca-
late into a serious conflict, so that the UN can avoid finding itself caught by surprise
as it was in the case of East Timor in 1999 (although the Department of Political
Affairs can also be overwhelmed with the amount of information that it has to pro-
cess.)
The Brahimi report also stressed that the mandates of peacekeeping operations
must be clear and not ambiguous (often peacekeeping mandates may be the result of
diplomatic bargaining that represents the lowest common denominator that is accept-
able to the members of the Security Council). Furthermore, the Brahimi report, as
well as other proposals, have stressed that the Security Council should not authorize
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mandates that cannot be implemented just to create the impression that something is
being done in response to international public opinion
 One of the main problems with peacekeeping is that it takes too long to deploy a
force. The United Nations has created a rapid reaction force, the Stand-By High-
Readiness Brigades (SHIRBRIG), that ideally should move quickly into a conflict
situation. But states that have promised to supply troops should be willing to actu-
ally allow them to be used for such a force, so that they can be rapidly deployed in a
conflict without delay. Furthermore, the agreements called for in article 43 of the
Charter, whereby states agree to provide military forces to the Security Council
should finally be negotiated, although the United States would probably not partici-
pate in the creation of any UN standby force.147  Other member states of the UN also
are not yet ready to surrender their sovereignty over the troops that they contribute
to UN peacekeeping operations, which would be entailed in the creation of a UN
standing or more permanent type of force. Additionally, more civilian police offic-
ers should be on call and available to the UN for service in a peacekeeping operation
as suggested by the Brahimi report. Certainly there are practical changes that can be
made in the machinery and infrastructure of peacekeeping, although as always in
international relations, the critical element in the establishment of sustainable peace
is the willingness of the Great Powers to act and to try and go beyond, as Kofi
Annan has said, a narrow conception of their national interest and be impelled by a
broader, more collective sense that their national interest lies with world society as a
whole. z148
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